Game dynamics with a mixed strategy player is studied. A new attracting set emerges under a certain condition by introducing a mixed strategy into a system with a pure strategies system. In terms of a replicator system, introducing a mixed strategy means to increase the number of rows and columns of the interaction matrix by 1 without changing its rank size. As a result, a system has a neutral dimension and a new attracting set emerges on the center manifold of a xed point. A possible scenario of evolution via a mixed strategy is briey discussed.
A game theory denes a nite n-person normal form game as a set of n pure strategies with an associated n Â n payo matrix. If strategy i is played against strategy j, the expected payo to strategy i is simply given by A ij . Any mixed strategy assigns probabilities to each pure strategy.
Maynard Smith had introduced a notion of evolutionary game dynamics 1) in which he considers the population dynamics of players using pure/mixed strategy. The simplest form of this dynamics was developed by Maynard Smith 2, 3) and Taylor and Jonker, 4) and is now widely studied as the replicator dynamics system.
The time evolution of replicator dynamics having n pure strategies with the pay-o matrix A is given by
where x i denotes the relative frequency of the player using pure strategy i. Hence the conditions P x i ¼ 1 and x i ! 0 should be satised.
Some new and interesting behaviors of this dynamics as a dynamical system have been found. 5{8) In this letter, we study a role of mixed strategy in the population of pure strategies.
Previously, in the book of evolutionary game theory by Maynard Smith, 3) it has been argued that game behaviors change depending on whether each player can use a pure or a mixed strategy. An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is used for the solution concept of a game system; when most individuals adopt the ESS strategy, no mutant strategy can invade the population. However, whether or not an ESS with only pure strategies ensures a stable polymorphic population using mixed strategies is not fully understood. 9{11) As is discussed by Zeeman, 9) we should study the dynamics of a probability density over a strategy space. While this density dynamics has not been fully analyzed, some phenomenological studies have been reported. Examples can be found in some three-strategy games 3, 10) and more recently in the prisoner's game with one memory strategy. 12) In the former case, ESS disappears and in the latter case a new ESS (as an equilibrium point) appears at a boundary. In this letter, we report how a new attracting set, not restricted to an equilibrium ESS, can emerge by having mixed strategies.
In addition to the ESS arguments, mixed strategies are important to study since they open up a new way of understanding evolution. The original replicator system has a xed state space. Study of evolution requires changing the state space or the updating of the interaction matrix; however, we have no realistic way of doing so (cf. Tokita and Yasutomi 13) ). Moreover, we do not believe that evolution always creates a new character. As Ohno 14) and Jacob 15) argue, the evolutionary process can be taken as a bricolage; it does not produce novelties from scratch but from recombinations of old materials. We return to this point later, and proceed to the analysis of replicator game dynamics with a mixed strategy.
An extension of game dynamics to include mixed strategies is straightforward. Here we assume that the number of pure strategies (n) is nite and that of mixed strategies (m) is also nite. The probability which the mixed strategy k assigns to the pure strategy i is denoted by s 
. . . ; m) on a pure strategy space, we rewrite the game dynamics as
where y i denotes the relative frequency of a player using strategy i. A pure strategy is dened as a vector whose components have n À 1 zeros and a single unity element.
Comparing eq. (2) with eq. (1), we notice that this equation has a new interaction matrix B ij (¼ t s i As j ) and is dened on the m À 1 dimensional simplex instead of on n À 1. Namely, the relative frequency of pure strategy x i is now given by P j s j i y j . Dening the n Â m matrix S by ðs 1 j Á Á Á js m Þ, we nd the time evolution of x,
Time derivative _ x x is generally determined by the detailed structure of S.
A restriction of B by A, i.e., rankðBÞ rankðAÞ, eectively lowers the degrees of freedom of this dynamics. Moreover, the sets of points which are projected onto the equilibrium points of the original equation, eq. (1), by S are the equilibrium points of eq. (2) and they constitute an ðm À nÞ-dimension hyperplane on the simplex S mÀ1 . Let¼ fyjy i ¼ q i ði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ; y i ¼ 0ði ¼ n þ 1; . . . ; mÞg, where q is an internal equilibrium point of the dynamics of eq. (1),
. . . ; n)), andhas ðn À 1Þ stable directions on the simplex S nÀ1 and ðm À nÞ neutral directions on a hyperplane. Since the expected reward when the state is on the hyperplane is exactly the same as that ofq q, mixed strategies can overtake the population by chance. However, the dynamical behaviors may be quite dierent along this hyperplane. As a main focus of this letter, we report that a three-purestrategy game with two stable equilibriums (one at the corner and one internally in three-dimensional strategy space) can have an innite number of periodic solutions consisting of mixed strategies when the internal equilibrium point is not ESS. This clearly shows that polymorphic solutions (mixed-strategy-involved) exhibit qualitatively dierent behaviors than solutions of pure strategies. Below, we introduce a payo matrix under a certain condition and show that the above statement holds.
The game matrix of an evolutionary game system, with three-pure-strategies which have an internal equilibrium point, can be translated into the following form eq. (4). This translation does not change the topological characteristics of ows on the phase space.
It is easily shown that this game system has a unique internal equilibrium point q at 1 3 ð1; 1; 1Þ. By means of a conventional linear stability analysis, we compute that a necessary and sucient condition for making q stable is
and a necessary and sucient condition for making q an ESS is given by,
Thus a necessary and sucient condition for making q stable but not an ESS is,
Without loss of generality, we assume d ¼ 1. Under condition (7), we particularly focus on the following region where two saddles, which will be dened as r 1 and r 2 , appear.
Because it is more complicated to prove the emergence of a new attracting set in general cases, here we assume condition (8) . We have already conrmed that our argument here is valid in more general cases and the detailed proof will be reported elsewhere. Under conditions (7) and (8), this game system has six equilibrium points (Fig. 1) .
. p 1 ¼ ð1; 0; 0Þ, p 2 ¼ ð0; 1; 0Þ and p 3 ¼ ð0; 0; 1Þ for the pure strategies.
A basin boundary of p 1 and q is given by a heteroclinic orbit from p 2 to r 2 . Now we introduce a mixed strategy v ¼ ð0; 1 À k; kÞ using pure strategies 2 and 3. It is easy to extend this mixed strategy to use three pure strategies, but for simplicity we argue this two-pure-strategies case. Taking this strategy as the fourth corner, we embed S 2 onto S 3 as shown in Fig. 2 1Àc kð2þbÀcÞ Þ. They are projected onto q and r 1 respectively by applying matrix S. We assume that parameter k satises the condition
so thatr r 3 is onp p 2 {p p 4 and0 is on the plane includingp p 1 , p p 3 andp p 4 . Under conditions (7), (8) and (9),0 is unstable on the planep p 1 {p p 3 {p p 4 . Sinceis stable on planep p 1 {p p 2 {p p 3 , stability perpendicular to lineq q{0 changes (see Fig. 2 ). Let us parameterize points on this lineq q{0 by (q qðÞ ¼ ð1 À Þþ0 ð0 1Þ). From simple calculation, we found the point at which stability alternates at1 (¼q qð 1 Þ), where 1 ¼ 2 ð2þbÀcÞk . In particular, point1 is a center whose eigenvalues have only imaginary parts.
There are several invariant curved surfaces, where no ows penetrating these curved surfaces exist. The following argument mainly focuses on the basin boundary between equilibrium pointsq q{1 andp p 1 . These correspond to the two equilibrium points of the original game system. The neighbors around0 are attracted to pointp p 1 . Sinceq q{1 are stable xed points, their neighbors are attracted to them. The basin boundary should be penetrated by the line connectingand0 . If no other attractors exist in this system, neighbors aroundq q{1 are attracted to the pointsq q{1 and those around1 {0 are attracted top p 1 . Surprisingly, the situation is rather complicated and we have found a third attracting set. The existence of this attracting set is found numerically rst and then conrmed analytically to some extent.
A precise boundary structure is obtained by the ow structure around lineq q{0 . We notice that a saddle point r r 2 has a two dimensional stable manifold. This manifold is a curved surface having two heteroclinic orbits on its boundary, which are0 !r r 2 on planep p 1 {p p 3 {p p 4 and p p 2 !r r 2 on planep p 1 {p p 2 {p p 3 (see Fig. 2 ). We dene as this stable manifold ofr r 2 below. can be divided into two regions, one consisting of heteroclinic orbits fromp p 2 and the other consisting of heteroclinic orbits fromq qðÞ which are unstable. We label the former 1 and the latter 2 (see Fig. 3) .
The boundary of 1 and 2 is a heteroclinic orbit tor r 2 from a point on liner r 1 {r r 3 . We label this pointr r 5 below. There exists a heteroclinic orbit fromp p 2 tor r 5 and also a heteroclinic orbit fromp p 3 tor r 5 . Thus 2 has a heteroclinic cyclep p 3 !r r 5 !r r 2 on its boundary, and we call this heteroclinic cycle C. Now we dene a new critical point2 ¼q qð 2 Þ on linẽ{0 . There exists an orbit which starts from2 and composes the boundary of 2 . Judging from the facts that1 is neutral, and that for close to 1 ,q qð < 1 Þ is stable andq qð > 1 Þ is unstable, we conclude that 2 is larger than 1 . Indeed,2 has an unstable manifold which has the heteroclinic cycle C on its boundary. We call this invariant curved surface . Every point on except2 converges to C. Due to the center manifold theorem, we have at least one center manifold through1 . Let us call this invariant surface . Sinceq qðÞ ( < 1 ) has stable directions andðÞ ( > 1 ) has unstable directions, no point on has1 as -limit or !-limit set. Considering this and the fact that is two-dimensional, every orbit on has to be periodic. has the heteroclinic cycle C as its boundary because C is the unique closed orbit including the boudary of the phase space. Thus, is lled densely with periodic orbits.
We now have a region enclosed with and . Clearly, orbits in this region converge to neitherp p 1 norq q{1 but to some attracting set. Since every orbit near1 remains in the neighbor of1 and since an unstable manifold ofðÞ ( > 1 ) is two-dimensional, an unstable manifold ofðÞ in the neighbor of1 has a periodic orbit on as its boundary. Since the unstable manifold of2 has C as its boundary, and considering the continuity of ow structure, we see that every unstable manifold ofq qð 1 < < 2 Þ has a periodic orbit on as its boundary. As a result, we have found that center manifold of1 has a basin whose volume is positive and becomes a new attracting set of the system.
We select the parameters under conditions (7){ (9) Numerically, point2 is found at 2 ' 0:3.
We found that above 1 and under 2 , there are regions which do not converge top p 1 but converge to certain periodic solutions (Fig. 4) . An example of an initial state which converges to the periodic orbit is depicted in Fig. 5 .
We found that this attracting set has an uncountable innite number of cycles on standing in line around1 . It is bounded by the heteroclinic cycle C. This situation is depicted in Fig. 6 .
As we mentioned earlier, if a three-strategy game has a non-ESS internal stable equilibrium point, we can always select a mixed strategy that generates an attracting set internally, consisting of an innite number of periodic orbits. Discussions on the generic cases will be reported elsewhere. In this study, we have found a new attracting set by introducing a mixed strategy into game dynamics. A new strategy does not mean bringing a new action into the game system. It is no more than a stochastic combination of already existing actions. The game structure itself does not change, but the behavior changes nevertheless.
Attractors in the original system are all equilibrium points. However, a newly emerging attracting set consists of an innite number of periodic cycles. This means that the eective degrees of freedom of the system have been increased by introducing a mixed strategy without changing the game structure itself.
The original system has an internal equilibrium point which is stable. The introduced strategy is a mixed strategy of two pure strategies; however, an equilibrium between the new strategy and the two pure strategies is set unstable. Such a situation occurs generally where the internal equilibrium point is stable but not an ESS (on the other hand, where the internal stable equilibrium point is an ESS, this situation never occurs). Therefore, the new attracting set found in this study is not a special case. Rather, it is a general characteristic of a game with mixed strategies. We have shown that a mixed strategy may expand the dimensionality of an attractor to form a new solution set, which was not discussed by Maynard Smith or in other related works. 2) From the point of view of evolutionary biology, introducing a mixed strategy may be considered as an appearance of a mutant whose character can be described merely by a recombination of the characters of pre-existing species. This situation corresponds to increasing the size of the interaction matrix without changing its rank size. When the system is at the internal equilibrium point, the mutant can invade and overtake the population by chance since the mutant has the same tness (payo). The appearance of a mutant often changes the structures of attractors; however, a completely new character is not required for a mutant to overtake the population.
We should discuss several other important situations: what happens if 1) more than one mixed strategy is introduced, 2) the internal attractors are not equilibrium points (e.g., a limit cycle or quasi-periodic state) and 3) the stability ofand0 is reversed. These discussions will be reported elsewhere. Orbits which started from the neighbors ofq qð < 1 Þ are attracted tõð < 1 Þ and orbits which started from the neighbors ofq qð > 2 Þ are attracted top p 1 .
